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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
(administered by the 
Director of Finance) , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 




NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10008 
This case calls for the Supreme Court's review 
of the Industrial Commission's proceedings and 
decision awarding Workmen's Compensation bene-
ifts to Mary Merkley Sander, relating to the death 
of her husband, Isabrand Sander, for the purpose 
of determining whether the Commission exceeded 
its powers and whether the findings of fact support 
the Commission's award. 
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DISPOSITION BEFORE 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On July 10, 1963, the Industrial Commission 
held a hearing on Mrs. Sander's application. On Au-
gust 12, 1963 the Industrial Commission rendered 
its decision in the form of an Order. The Commis-
sion held that Mr. Sander's death on August 4, 1962, 
resulted from an accident in the course of his em-
ployment. The Commission ordered the employer and 
the State Insurance Fund to pay a total of $11,170 
compensation to Mary Merkley Sander, plus $525 
funeral expenses. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PETITION 
The Plaintiff, the State Insurance Fund, in this 
certiorari proceeding, seeks to have the Supreme 
Court of Utah reverse, vacate and annul the award 
which the Industrial Commission made in its deci-
sion and order dated August 12, 1963. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the morning of Saturday, August 4, 1962, 
Mr. Isabrand Sander was driving an Oldsmobile 
automobile in a westerly direction on 4th South 
Street in Salt Lake City, and the automobile crashed 
into a concrete bridge near 1Oth West Street, caus-
ing injuries to Mr. Sander, resulting in almost in-
stant death. Mr. Sander's widow, Mary Merkley 
Sander, filed an application with the Industrial Com-
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mission of Utah on April 10, 1963, in which she 
alleged that Isabrand Sander's fatal injuries were 
received while he was in the course of his employ-
ment as the president of I. Sander, Inc. She there-
fore requested the benefits provided by the Utah 
Workmen's Compensation law. The employer cor-
poration's Workmen's Compensation insurance car-
rier was the State Insurance Fund, which denied 
any liability. The Industrial Commission held a hear-
ing on July 10, 1963. 
On August 12, 1963 the Industrial Commis-
sion rendered its decision in the form of an Order 
(R. 97), in which it said that although there was no 
evidence, other than custom, to support a finding 
that Mr. Sander was in the course of his employ-
ment, his death was compensable; and the Commis-
sion ordered the State Insurance Fund to pay a total 
of $11,710 compensation to Mrs. Sander, plus $525 
funeral expenses. On September 3, 1963 the Fund 
filed an Application for Rehearing, which the Com-
mission denied on September 23, 1963. 
Many years ago Mr. Sander started his oil and 
gas distribution business when he was living at 
Heber City, Utah. Later he incorporated this busi-
ness under the name of I. Sander, Inc. In 1950 the 
comapny's headquarters were moved to Salt Lake 
City; and Mr. and Mrs. Sander also moved their resi-
dence to Salt Lake City. At first the company's 
office was in one room of the home of Mr. and Mrs. 
Hosford at 219 Douglas Street. (Mrs. Hosford was 
one of Sander's daughters.) In the meantime Mrs. 
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Sander's sister bought the Ivanhoe Apartments at 
415, 417 and 419 East 3rd South in Salt Lake City. 
In order to help her fill up some of the apartments, 
Mr. and Mrs. Sanders rented and moved into Apt. 
8 of the Ivanhoe Apts. Also in 1953 the offices of 
I. Sander, Inc. were moved from the Hosford resi-
dence to Apartment 14 of the Ivanhoe Apts., which 
is at 419 East 3rd South. In 1956 the company's 
business activities required more space and differ-
ent arrangements. So the company purchased some 
ground and built a building at 1815 West 5th South 
in Salt Lake City for use as its office and trucking 
terminal. (R. 15 and 57) All of the company's em-
ployees, their desks and other office equipment were 
moved from 419 East 3rd South to the company's 
offices at 1815 West 5th South, with the exception 
of Mr. Sander's desk and some other equipment, 
which were left in Apt. No. 14 at 419 East 3rd South, 
for his convenience, etc. ( R. 22) 
During the three year period the company had 
its office in Apt. 14 at 419 East 3rd South, the com-
pany issued its checks to pay the rent and all of 
the other expenses. There was a little vagueness in 
the testimony about the arrangements for payment 
of the $70 monthly rental of Apt. 14 after the com-
pany's office was moved to west 5th South in 1956. 
Mr. Hosford, who was the general manager, testi-
fied that the company increased Mr. Sander's sal-
ary by an amount sufficient to equal the monthly 
rental, and Mr. Sander then paid the rental for Apt. 
14 from his own money. But Mr. Hosford said he 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
could not remember what amounts Mr. Sander's 
salary was increased from and to. (R. 15-16) Mr. 
James Heber Moulton was the company's office man-
ager and he made out the payroll checks each month. 
He testified that, according to the way he remem-
bered it, Mr. Sander's salary was $2,000 per month 
at that time, and Mr. Sander volunteered to pay the 
rent on Apt. 14 out of his own salary. This was 
agreeable to Mr. Hosford and Mr. Moulton, so Mr. 
Sander did that from then on. (R. 58) At a later 
period, when the company's financial position was 
not very healthy, Mr. Sander's salary was reduced 
to $1,000 per month; and he continued to pay the 




THERE WAS NO COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION'S FINDING AND CONCLUSION THAT 
THE DECEASED, ISABRAND SANDER, WAS 
IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT AT 
THE TIME OF THE FATAL COLLISION. 
Mr. Isabrand Sander was 72 years old in 1962. 
He was still president of the corporation which he 
had founded, but it was quite apparent that he was 
in substantially a "retired" status. He had trans-
ferred practically all of his stock (ownership in the 
corporation), to his several children during the years 
preceding his death. (R. 28) His son-in-law, Mr. 
Hosford, was the general manager of the company 
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and was directly in charge of the company's busi-
ness. Mr. Sander still gave the other officers of the 
company his advice and counsel on various occa-
sions; but for most purposes he had retired from 
active participation in the affairs of the company. 
The so-called "office" in Apt. 14 at 419 East 
3rd South, had Mr. Sander's desk in it, and a type-
writer and filing cabinets, and there was also a tele-
vision set, a contour chair, a davenport, a bed, as 
well as a stove, refrigerator, kitchen table and 
chairs. This "office" apartment was on the same 
floor as Apartment No. 8, in which Mr. and Mrs. 
Sander lived. He was the only one whose "office" 
was supposed to be located in Apt. No. 14. Appar-
ently he could use this apartment in the same way 
as some men use their den in their home, as a more-
or-less private or semi-private unit to which they 
can escape temporarily at periods from the other 
members of their family, and in which they can 
have some privacy to engage in such serious or frivo-
lous pastimes as they might be inclined. Mr. Sander 
could devote as much or as little time to thinking 
about the company's welfare and general activities 
as he might choose to do, and in discussions with 
the company's personnel. He was not required to 
punch a time-clock or to spend any particular hours 
in Apt. No. 14 or at the 5th South office of the com-
pany, or in the performance of any other service 
for the company. He also could devote whatever time 
he wished to his own personal affairs or matters 
having nothing to do with the business of the com-
pany. His time was his own to do with as he saw fit. 
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The third paragraph of the Industrial Com-
mission's decision ( R. 97) reads as follows: 
The only issue to be resolved by the Com-
mission is whether the deceased was in the 
course of his employment by I. Sander, Inc. 
on August 4, 1962, or more particularly at the 
time of the fatal accident, 9 :40 A.M. Was he 
in fact on his way to the west side office at 
1815 West 5th South Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah? 
The Commission was in error in assuming that 
the first sentence and the second sentence meant 
the san1e thing. The first sentence correctly stated 
the main issue to be whether Mr. Sander "was in 
the course of his employment * * * at the time of 
the fatal accident." The next sentence: "Was he in 
fact on his way to the west side office?" is not the 
same question. It is not complete. Even if he were 
on his way to the company's office at 1815 West 
5th South, that fact alone would not be sufficient 
to bring him into the course of his employment and 
under the coverage of the Utah Workmen's Com-
pensation law. Any employee, whether he is the presi-
dent of the company or holds some lesser job, must 
be doing something more than being "on his way 
to" the company's office, in order to be covered. He 
is not covered when he is on his way from his home 
to his en1ployer's place of business in the morning 
(or the commencement of his shift). Neither is he 
covered when going to or returning from lunch or 
other meal. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. vs. Ind. 
Comm., 100 Utah 8, 110 P.2d 334. 
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The last sentence of the fourth paragraph of 
the Commission's decision ( R. 97), quotes the wit-
ness, Gregory F. Hosford (who was a son-in-law of 
Mr. and Mrs. Sander), as testifying that Mr. Sander 
"was enroute from the office at 419 East 3rd South 
to the office at 1815 West 5th South." That testi-
mony of Mr. Hosford (R. 18), was nothing but hear-
say; and it was his own guess or conclusion. Mr. 
Hosford himself admitted that he was not in Salt 
Lake City at the time of Mr. Sander's collision. 
He was in Fillmore at that time. He first learned 
of the accident when Mr. Moulton told him about 
it over the telephone. (R. 20) It is interesting to 
note that Hosford also jumped to an erroneous con-
clusion in testifying that Mr. Moulton was on duty 
at the west side office that morning. ( R. 20) Actual-
ly Mr. Moulton spent most of the morning attending 
a family gathering in a building some distance away 
from the company's office. (R. 56) On cross exam-
ination Mr. Hosford testified that he left Salt Lake 
City about 8 :00 A.M. on August 4, 1962 and he 
flew to Filmore on some business for the company. 
He did not see Mr. Sander at all that day, and he 
did not have any conversation with him. (R. 37) 
The sixth paragraph of the Industrial Commis-
sion's decision (R. 97), reads: 
Although we have no evidence, other than 
custom, we believe that the evidence adduced 
supports a finding that the deceased was on 
his way from the east side office to the west 
side office at the time of the fatal injury. 
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We assume that the Commission was making 
a finding and conclusion to that effect. There might 
have been some basis for the Commission to find 
that Mr. Sander "was on his way to the west side 
office" that morning. Both his custom and Mrs. San-
der's testimony that he may have told her, while 
they were eating breakfast, that he intended going 
to the 5th South office that morning ( R. 52), might 
lend some support to such a finding. But the Com-
mission apparently overlooked an important point. 
There was absolutely no evidence in the record, either 
of custom or otherwise, upon which to base a find-
ing that Mr. Sander "was on his way from the east 
side office." (Emphasis added.) 
The only testimony from anyone who actually 
saw Mr. Sander or had any conversation with him 
on the morning of August 4, 1962, came from his 
wife, the applicant in the Industrial Commission's 
proceedings. Mr. and Mrs. Sander slept in separate 
bedrooms in their apartment. She testified that when 
she arose that morning she first went to his room. 
He was already up. (R. 48) She saw him in the 
bathroon1, and said, "Well, good morning." When 
he finished in the bathroom he went over to Apt. 
14. She prepared their breakfast, then called him 
on the telephone about 7:30. He came over to their 
apartment (No. 8) and they ate breakfast together. 
She first testified that she did not remember of 
him telling her, while they were eating breakfast, 
that he was going to the 5th South office that morn-
ing. ( R. 50) Later she said that he may or may not 
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have told her that he was going to the 5th South 
office that morning. (R. 52) She testified that cus-
tomarily he did go down to the 5th South office on 
Saturday mornings. 
Mrs. Sander did not know at what time Mr. 
Sander had gone out and driven away in the Olds-
mobile. The first that she knew he was gone was 
when she looked out of their kitchen window and 
she noticed that the Oldsmobile was not there. She 
estimated that that was about 9 :30 A.M. ( R. 51) 
There was no proof as to what Mr. Sander was 
doing in Apt. 14 for that part of the time he may 
have been there between 7 A.M. and 7 :30 A.M. 
that day; whether he was working, or reading the 
morning newspaper or listening to news on the 
radio or TV, or taking a nap, or any of the various 
things which different men in Salt Lake City do 
between 7 :00 and 7 :30 in the morning on Satur-
days. Mrs. Sander did not know what he was doing 
in Apt. 14 that morning. He did not tell her that 
he was working. ( R. 49) There is no evidence of 
any kind that he did any work for the corporation 
that morning. The mere fact that he might have 
done some work in Apt. 14 would not necessarily 
mean that he had entered on duty for the company 
shortly after 7 A.M. and that all of his actions and 
movements after 7 A.M. that day must be consid-
ered as coming within the scope of his employment. 
There is also a lack of any competent evidence 
to prove what Mr. Sander might have been doing 
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after he finished eating his breakfast and before 
the Oldsmobile he was driving crashed into the con-
crete bridge later that morning. With such lack of 
proof, any finding or inference which the Industrial 
Commission might make, to the effect that after 
his breakfast Mr. Sander went back to Apt. 14 and 
then later went from there to the 5th South office, 
is clearly unsupported by competent evidence. 
It is our contention that there was no proof that 
it was Mr. Sander's custom to go from what the 
Commission called the "east side office" (Apt. 14 in 
the Ivanhoe Apartments), to the company's main 
office on 5th South on Saturday mornings generally, 
or on that Saturday morning, August 4, 1962 in 
particular. 
Mr. Hosford testified that Mr. Sander "periodi-
cally would come down to 1815 West 5th South to 
see us." (R. 17) He also explained that his under-
standing relating to Mr. Sander's movements on the 
day of his death, were based on his knowledge of his 
custom for the previous 13 years (R. 37); also what 
he (Hosford) was told over the telephone while he 
was in Fillmore, and what he was told when he re-
turned to Salt Lake City. (R. 19 and 37) But even 
Mr. Hosford (who was apparently doing all he could 
to make the case compensable), did not state that 
it was Mr. Sander's custom to go from Apt. 14 at 
419 E. 3rd South, on the occasions when he would 
come down to the 5th South office. It would have 
been only hearsay if he had so testified. 
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Mr. Moulton testified that Mr. Sander came 
down to the 5th South office often. (R.54) When 
asked what he meant by "often," he said that in 
one period Mr. Sander had spent the whole day there 
for two weeks at a time. Then there were "other 
times when we'd go for a whole week without seeing 
him." On August 4, 1962 Mr. Moulton did not know 
whether Mr. Sander was coming down to the 5th 
South office. (R. 55-56) He had not talked with him 
on the phone. Both he and Mr. Nelson, the account-
ant, testified that they did not have any arrange-
ments to meet Mr. Sander at the 5th South office 
that morning; and there was no special meeting 
planned for that morning. ( R. 68) 
Mr. Nelson, and his son who took care of the 
lawn, were the only employees of the company at 
the 5th South office after Moulton left for his family 
gathering. (R. 65 and 67) 
There was considerable effort on the part of 
applicant's attorney and witnesses to establish that 
Mr. Sander had been working on a device, somewhat 
like a miniature slot machine, which might be used 
as a sales promotion scheme by service stations to 
influence customers to buy gasoline at their particu-
lar stations in hopes of getting their purchase free, 
if three numbers of the same kind came up on the 
device. (R. 19, 54 and 69) Mr. Sander had one of 
those devices in the trunk of his Oldsmobile at the 
time of the fatal crash. At least it was there the 
following Monday or Tuesday when Mr. Hosford and 
Mr. Moulton and Mr. Nelson examined the trunk 
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of the wrecked car. (R. 19, 55 and 69) Mr. Sander 
had been working on that device for quite a while 
prior to that day, and he no doubt had been carrying 
it in his automobile for some considerable time. 
There was no evidence that he was making any spe-
cial trip to the company's 5th South office that morn-
ing in connection with that device, or for any other 
purpose; and the Industrial Commission's decision 
so held. (R. 97) Therefore it cannot have any sig-
nificance in the consideration of the question of 
whether he was in the course of his employment that 
morning. In the case of Greer vs. Ind. Comm., 74 
Utah 379, 279 Pac. 900, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that carrying of a tool or other object relating 
to the employer's business, must have been the main 
purpose of the trip in order to be under the cover-
age of the Workmen's Compensation law, and not 
just incidental to the trip of the employee in going 
to or from work. 
There was also some testimony that the corpo-
ration paid the monthly charge for the telephone 
which Mr. Sander had in Apt. 14 of the Ivanhoe 
Apartments, in his own name under an unlisted 
number. (R. 14 and 58) That fact was not of par-
ticular importance. The company also paid the tele-
phone bill on Mr. Hosford's home telephone; and 
probably also on Mr. Moulton's. (R. 30-31) That 
was done because all of those phones were used re-
lating to the company's business on occasions. 
In the discussion of our present case, the case 
of Vitagraph, Inc., vs. Ind. Comm., 96 Utah 190, 85 
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P.2d 601, contains some points which are helpful. 
Mr. P. 0. Perry was employed on a part time basis 
by Vitagraph, Inc. to be present at times when their 
pictures were being shown in different theatres in 
Salt Lake City. He would check the number of pay-
ing customers and at a later time make a written 
report and mail it to the company's office. After one 
such evening at the Southeast Theatre he put the 
tallying machine in his pocket and started to go to 
his home. While crossing a street for the purpose 
of boarding a bus he was struck by an automobile 
and injured. He had intended preparing his report 
at home that evening or the following morning, as 
he usually did. On some occasions he had prepared 
the report before leaving the theatre. The Industrial 
Commission awarded compensation to Mr. Perry. 
The Supreme Court annulled the award. The Court 
held that the accident was not in the course of his 
employment. At page 194 of the Court's opinion, 
it said: 
The question as to when one is in the 
course of his employment has often been be-
fore the courts. Certain indicia to guide one 
in answering the question have been laid down 
by the courts but no fixed rule can be promul-
gated and each case must be determined large-
ly from its own facts. It seems definitely set-
tled that if a workman is injured in the nor-
mal course of things, in going to or from his 
work or place of employment, that is the re-
sult of the general hazards which all must 
meet and assume and is not in the course of 
his employment. 
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At page 2 01 of the Court's opinion is a quote 
fron1 a previous case of Greer vs. Ind. Comm., 74 
Utah 379, 279 Pac. 900: 
But the mission (for the employer) must 
be the major factor in the journey or move-
ment, and not merely incidental thereto; that 
is to say if incidental to the main purpose of 
going to or from the place of employment, it 
would not bring such person under the protec-
tion of the Act. * * * Under the facts in the 
instant case, it is clear that the deceased was 
not upon any special mission for his employer 
at the time of the accident. There was nothing 
he was doing for his master at the time which 
exposed him to the perils of the street. He was 
merely going from his home to his place of 
employment. The fact that he was carrying 
the saw was merely incidental. * * * In this 
case the deceased was not injured while he 
was sharpening the saw at his home. The ac-
cident did not occur while he was actually en-
gaged in the performance of a duty for the 
employer. The dangers of the street between 
his home and the stockyards were not incident 
to his employment, but were dangers common 
to all. 
To the same effect as the above mentioned 
Greer case, is one cited in 99 Corpus Juris Secun-
dum, Section 232 relating to the "going and com-
ing rule," namely Sylvan vs. Sylvan Bros., 82 SE2d 
794, 225 s. c. 429 : 
Injuries sustained by executive who 
slipped and fell on sjdewalk on the way from 
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home to place of employment was neither in 
course of, nor arising out of, his employment, 
notwithstanding he was carrying business 
papers which he had prepared in his home pre-
vious evening; the journey to and from home 
to place of employment was not in course of 
employment, because main purpose of it was 
to go home or to return to place of employ-
ment, and journey would be made irrespective 
of homework which employee might be car-
rying. 
We are familiar with the case of Morgan vs. 
lnd Comm., 92 Utah 129, 66 P.2d 144, which the 
defendants may cite in their argument. Samuel Mor-
gan was the principal of the Davis County High 
School at Kaysvile. On the afternoon of Sunday, 
Feb. 2, 1936, he went from his home to the school 
building for the purpose of making up his monthly 
report to the school district office, which he had 
been unable to complete the previous Friday and 
Saturday; also he was going to return some account 
books, etc. to his office safe. After entering the build-
ing he found that he had left his personal keys at 
home, including the key to the principal's office. He 
returned home to obtain the key. He was detained 
at home by his lunch and some visitors and some 
other things of a personal nature; so he did not start 
back to the school building until10 o'clock that eve-
ning. When he was walking on the roadway between 
his home and the school building he was struck by 
an automobile and injured. After hearing his case, 
the Industrial Commission denied his claim for com-
pensation benefits. The Supreme Court of Utah re-
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versed the Commission's decision. The Court held 
that Mr. Morgan was on a special trip for his em-
ployer at the time of his accident and was therefore 
covered by the W. C. law. 
Although the Supreme Court's decision in the 
Morgan case was by a unanimous opinion, Justice 
Wolfe wrote a concurring opinion. But four years 
later, in the case of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. vs. 
Ind. Comm., 100 Utah 8, 110 P.2d 334, Justice Wolfe 
also wrote a concurring opinion, in which he said 
(at page 11) : 
If the case of Morgan vs. Industrial 
Comm. of Utah is correctly decided it is in 
point for the application herein and should be 
conclusive. But I do not think it was correct-
ly decided. * * *where an employee is return-
ing to do overtime work of the same nature 
as his regular work and where he stays over 
the regular time to perform it, he cannot be 
said to be on a special errand for his employer. 
Morgan was, within limits, his own boss. He 
had certain duties to perform at the school. 
Whether he performed them during regular 
hours or during such times as he might him-
self choose, would not put him on the course 
of a special errand so as to make his coming 
to and going from the locale of his work a 
part of the special errand. I am forced, there-
fore, to con~lude that the Morgan case was 
w~o~gly decided and that my own concurring 
opinion failed to note the distinction between 
ordinary work performed out of hours -
there being more of it done- and the special 
errand where the employment sets the travel-
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er forth upon a journey for some special pur-
pose and exposes him to its perils.'' 
In the above mentioned case of Goodyear Tire 
& Rubber Co. vs. lnd Comm., the employee, Lee 
James Harris, was working overtime on the eve-
ning of May 8, 1939. Before the work was finished 
he borrowed the company motorcycle, drove home 
to dinner, took his little sister for a ride, ate his din-
ner; and on the return trip to his employer's premises 
he had an accident. The Industrial Commission 
awarded Workmen's Compensation benefits to Har-
ris; but the Supreme Court of Utah annulled the 
award. The Court's opinion said that it was imma-
terial whether Harris was specifically directed to go 
to dinner or not. At page 10 it said: 
The specific direction merely fixed the 
time of going, but did not control Harris' ac-
tions while going to, eating, or returning from 
dinner. Stress has been laid on the fact that 
Harris was working overtime and the acci-
dent did not happen during regular working 
hours. That, too, we believe to be immaterial, 
as no effort was made to control his actions 
while absent for dinner. 
POINT 2 
BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AN A WARD, THE IN-
DUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS REQUIRED BY 
LAW TO DENY COMPENSATION BENEFITS 
TO DECEASED'S DEPENDENT. 
In the case of Wherritt vs. Ind. Comm., 100 
Utah 68, 110 P.2d 37 4, Dr. Barton H. Wherritt died 
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from injuries which he received when his automo-
bile plunged over an embankment in City Creek 
Canyon about midnight, Feb. 4, 1940. That day Dr. 
When·itt had worked at the Intermountain Clinic 
until about 6 P.M., when he went home to dinner. 
About 8:-15 P.M. he left home, telling his wife that 
he had some work to do at the Clinic and some calls 
to make at the hospital. She also testified that he 
had earlier told her that he had to take some samples 
to the State Board of Health laboratory (in the 
State Capitol Building) to be analyzed. He was seen 
at the Clinic at 9 :50 P.M. and at the L.D.S. Hospi-
tal about 10:40 P.M. His fatal accident was about 
midnight on Wasatch Boulevard north of the State 
Capitol. There was nothing in the record to show 
that he left any samples at the Board of Health labo-
ratory that night, or that he had them in his car, or 
that he took any samples from the Clinic. In sus-
taining the Industrial Commission's denial of com-
pensation in that case, the Supreme Court of Utah, 
at page 70, said: 
T_he question left unanswered by the evi-
dence Is what Dr. Barton H. Wherritt was do-
ing at the time of the accident. Was he about 
his employer's business or was he on an er-
rand of his own? · 
~he burden _of proof is upon applicant to 
establish her claim for compensation. Higley 
l'S: Ind. Comm., 75 Utah 361, 285 Pac. 306; 
Btngham Mines Co. vs. Alsop. 59 Utah 306 
203 Pac. 644. ' 
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Where the industrial Commission is driven to 
surmise or conjecture, the injured person or his de-
pendents cannot recover compensation benefits. The 
fact finder is not bound to adopt the theory of the 
applicant even if there is some evidence to support 
it. Sugar vs. Ind. Comm., 94 Utah 56, 75 P.2d 311. 
Surmise, conjecture, guess or speculation is not suf-
ficient to justify a finding in behalf of the appli-
cant. Higley vs. Ind. Comm., 75 Utah 361, 285 Pac. 
306. 
It certainly cannot be presumed that an officer 
of a company, whether he is partialy retired or other-
wise, is in the course of his employment for the whole 
24 hours of every day, just because he might, dur-
ing that period of the day when he is at home, or 
while driving between his home and the place of 
business, or while he is eating his meals, or is shav-
ing himself, or while he is in bed unable to sleep, 
or on any other such occasion he might be thinking 
about some of the company's business affairs, or 
"trying to solve a problem," or "mulling things over 
in his mind," etc. 
Hearsay evidence, although allowable in an In-
dustrial Commission hearing, is not sufficient upon 
which to base an award. John Scowcrojt & Sons Co. 
vs. Ind. Comm., 70 Utah 116, 258 Pac. 339; Vecchio 
vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 128, 22 P.2d 212; Fish Lake 
Resort Co. vs. Ind Comm., 73 Utah 479, 275 Pac. 580. 
In the case of Diaz vs. Ind. Comm., 80 Utah 77, 
13 P.2d 307, at page 86 of the Court's opinion is 
the following: 
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• • • it • • • is urged by the defendants 
that • • • the commission was not bound by 
the usual common law or statutory rules of 
evidence. • • * In support of that the cases of 
Garfield Smelting Co. vs. Ind. Comm., 53 
Utah 133, 178 Pac. 57, and Rockefeller vs. Ind. 
Comm., 58 Utah 124, 197 Pac. 1038, are cited. 
• • • In the Garfield case a statement is made 
that the commission in its investigations may 
have recourse to hearsay evidence, but at the 
same time the court in most emphatic lan-
guage also said : "Yet when it makes its find-
ings every finding of fact must be based on 
some competent evidence." 
and at page 87 of the Court's opinion: 
If a material finding is not supported by 
sufficient or is against the legal competent 
evidence, it will be disapproved and set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the decision and or-
der of the Industrial Commission dated August 12, 
1963, should be annulled by this Court. 
Respectfuly submitted, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorney for Plaintiff, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
